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aBstraCt
This paper attempts to estimate the causal effect of government enforcement on compliance with minimum 
wages in South Africa, a country where considerable non-compliance exists. The number of labour inspectors 
per capita is used as a proxy for enforcement, whilst non-compliance is measured using an index of violation 
that measures both the proportion of individuals violated, as well as the average depth of individual violation. 
Due to the potential simultaneity between enforcement and compliance, the number of labour inspectors 
is instrumented by the number of non-inspectors. The results suggest that there are a variety of factors 
impacting on violation, including firm-level, sectoral and spatial characteristics. One of the key determinants 
of violation is found to be the local unemployment rate. However, the number of labour inspectors is found to 
be insignificant in determining non-compliance.
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1. introduCtion
A key problem affecting wage earners in developing countries is the issue of law enforcement, particularly the 
enforcement of legislation pertaining to minimum wages. There are a number of studies that investigate the 
problem of non-compliance amongst employers with minimum wage laws in developing countries (Basu, Chau 
and Kanbur, 2007; Andalón and Pagés, 2008). However, there is little empirical research on the determinants 
of non-compliance, particularly on the effects of enforcement on compliance with minimum wage laws. This 
paper attempts to investigate the determinants of non-compliance with minimum wage laws in South Africa, 
a country where an estimated 44% of employees receive sub-minimum wages (Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet, 
2010a). The number of labour inspectors is used as a measure of enforcement in order to estimate the causal 
effect of enforcement on compliance. Whilst the results do not show a significant effect of the number of 
labour inspectors on compliance, they suggest that local labour market characteristics may play an important 
role. Overall then, this paper contributes to the literature on the issue of non-compliance with minimum wage 
regulations in developing countries, and is the first attempt to undertake such an analysis of the determinants 
of non-compliance for South Africa.
As Ronconi (2010) notes, there are two key challenges in estimating the effect of enforcement on compliance. 
firstly, finding appropriate measures for both enforcement and compliance is problematic. In this paper, we 
measure violation or non-compliance of minimum wages using a family of indices of violation introduced in 
Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2010a), which capture both the incidence and the depth of violation. Enforcement 
is measured using the number of labour inspectors per capita as a proxy.
Secondly, there is a problem of endogeneity due to the potentially simultaneous relationship between 
enforcement and compliance. On the one hand, enforcement is likely to increase compliance due to firms 
being more likely to comply if their probability of being caught is higher. On the other hand, a government 
agency is likely to increase the number of inspectors or enforcement resources in response to low compliance 
levels. This paper attempts to deal with this endogeneity using the number of non-inspectors as an instrument 
for the number of labour inspectors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 below attempts to provide a brief summary of the 
issue of minimum wage violation in South Africa and the measure of violation. Section 3 describes some of the 
key variables used in the estimation of the causal effect of enforcement on compliance. Section 4 provides a 
description of the data and methodology used. Section 5 presents the econometric results of the determinants 
of violation using an instrumental variable approach. The final section, Section 6, concludes.
2. minimum WagE violation in south afriCa
In South Africa, minimum wages, known as sectoral determinations, are set by the Employment Conditions 
Commission, which is a representative body within the Department of labour (Dol) of South Africa. The 
minimum wages set are sector-occupation-location specific. As shown in Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet (2010a, b) 
however, levels of minimum wage violation in South Africa are considerably high, with 44% of covered workers 
earning below the legal minimum wage in 2007. This measure seems high compared with other countries: 
for instance in Argentina compliance with the minimum wage is 95% (Ronconi, 2008), whilst in Kenya non-
compliance is estimated at around 17% for salaried non-agricultural workers (Andalon and Pagés, 2008) 1.
In this paper, we use an index of violation introduced in Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet (2010a) to measure violation. 
Derived from the foster-greer-Thorbecke (1984) poverty measures, this index is used to measure the percentage 
of covered workers receiving sub-minimum wages, as well as the depth of violation, namely, the average gap 
between the stipulated minima and the actual wage paid. The index of violation has the following form:
Va = E{[(w 
m – w)/w m]a}
1 It is worth noting however, that these estimates are not directly comparable as the measurement of compliance differs 
by country. Therefore, these estimates must be interpreted with caution. 
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where w denotes wage, w m denotes the relevant minimum, α is an index that emphasizes concern on the 
depth of violation, and E is the expectation operator with respect to the wage distribution in the sector to which 
w m applies. When α = 0, the index collapses to the standard measure of violation—the percentage of covered 
workers earning sub-minimum wages. When α = 1, the index captures the average depth of violation 2. Whilst 
V0 measures the percentage of workers violated, that is, earning below the minimum, the ratio (V1 / V0 ) 
facilitates the interpretation of V1, since it denotes the percentage shortfall of the average wage of violated 
workers from the minimum wage. Put differently, violated workers in this sample are earning on average 
(V1 /V0 ) below the relevant minima.
In Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet (2010b), the authors attempt to estimate violation of minimum wages for the 
first time in South Africa using detailed matching of occupational, sectoral and locational codes in the 2007 
labour force Survey (Statistics South Africa) to the gazetted minimum wages 3. Non-compliance is highest 
within the Security sector, with worryingly high estimates of nearly 70% in some areas in 2007, followed by 
the farm and forestry sectors (55% and 53% respectively). furthermore, their results show that occupation 
as well as the location of employment matters in the level and depth of violation observed. Since the pattern 
of violation is not uniform across various sectors, occupations, and locations, it is important to understand the 
determinations of violation in order to attempt to explain the variation in non-compliance within the country.
Another interesting result observed in the violation estimates for South Africa is that the pattern of violation 
changes depending on whether we measure violation as the proportion of individuals earning below the 
minimum or as the shortfall of the wages of an individual from the minimum. for instance, whilst the proportion 
of Domestic workers violated (39%) is lower than that of farm workers (55%), the depth of violation for these 
two cohorts is similar (30% and 33% below the minima respectively). Another example is the Civil Engineering 
sector, which yields the lowest estimate for workers earning below the sector minimum (9%), but the highest 
depth of violation within the sample (42%). This result suggests both the share of workers below the minima 
and the distance of these workers below the minima matter for policy makers, as does understanding the 
factors contributing to both the incidence and the depth of violation. Therefore, in our analysis that follows, 
the determinants of both the probability of an individual being violated, as well as of the depth of violation, will 
be investigated.
3. variaBlE ChoiCE
Whilst the literature suggests that enforcement increases compliance, there is little empirical research 
measuring the effects of enforcement on compliance. Ronconi’s (2010a) study on Argentina constitutes one of 
the first attempts to empirically estimate the correlation between government enforcement and compliance with 
labour regulations in a developing country. Using data from 1995 to 2002, he attempts to analyse the statistical 
effect of enforcement on compliance using a two stage least squares (2SlS) estimation procedure. Ronconi 
uses the number of labour inspectors per capita working in provincial public enforcement agencies as a proxy 
for enforcement activity. He measures the extent of compliance by the percentage of private sector employees 
receiving legally mandated benefits, such as wages at the statutory minimum. Enforcement, as measured by 
the number of labour inspectors, was found to be positively associated with the extent of compliance.
In South Africa, the Dol uses a team of labour inspectors whose job is to enforce compliance with these sectoral 
determinations. Inspections in most cases are triggered by complaints by clients (reactive inspections), whilst 
2 Increasing the value of the parameter α places higher emphasis on larger violations.
3 The sectoral minima issued by the Dol are specific to the location of the workers. Areas are designated as types A, 
B, C, etc. This demarcation was conducted on the basis of the average household income recorded for the municipal 
area concerned in the 1996 census:
 A – Average income greater than R24, 000 per annum
 B – Average income between R12, 000 and R24, 000 per annum
 C – Average income less than R12, 000 per annum
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high risk sectors are identified at the national level and targeted through focused “blitz inspections”. The 
National Department of labour sets the allocations for the number of labour inspectors across the 9 provinces 
in the country. In 2007, there were in total 782 labour inspectors employed in the country, or in other words, 59 
inspectors per million workers 4. Data on enforcement activities in South Africa, however, is quite limited. Due 
to limited information on enforcement activities, the number of labour inspectors in 2007 at the provincial level 
was the best measure available at the time of this study to estimate the effect of enforcement on compliance.
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for the measures of compliance, enforcement, and the other 
explanatory variables used in this study. A variety of explanatory variables were included in the analysis such 
as individual, firm-level, contractual, and spatial characteristics. The individual characteristics included were 
race, gender, education, and age.
Table 1: Summary Statistics













None to Grade 8 6.6672 2.4441
Grade 9-11 1.4892 1.3764
Grade 12 0.2881 0.4529
Diploma 0.0450 0.2074
Degree 0.0136 0.1645
25-34 years 0.3687 0.4824
35-44 years 0.2487 0.4323
45-54 years 0.1806 0.3847
55-65 years 0.0789 0.2696












Contract Cleaning 0.1180 0.3226
Civil Engineering 0.0042 0.0648
4 This seems low compared to countries such as Uruguay (67) and Panama (69), but is larger than the size of the 
inspectorate per million workers in Argentina (22), Mexico (6), Columbia (15), and Brazil (34) (Ronconi, 2010).
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Small firm 0.2525 0.4345
Medium firm 0.1542 0.3611
Medium-Large firm 0.1611 0.3677
Union member 0.1857 0.3889
Written contract 0.6025 0.4894
Permanent contract 0.6422 0.4793
Tenure 5.3793 6.9852
Formal sector 0.5703 0.4950
Semi-formal 0.6467 0.4780











Area A 0.7303 0.4438
Labour force per mile2 946.7942 1146.0110
Local unemployment rate 0.3426 0.1045
Provincial budget(100,000s) 616.9416 248.7654
Labour centres per mile2 0.0013 0.0016
Inspectors per 100,000 1.551478 0.71132










Another measure of relevance in the compliance literature is the Kaitz index, which provides a measure of the 
rigidity or ‘toughness’ of the minimum wage set (Andalón and Pagés, 2008). A notable result from this study is 
that although minimum wages in Kenya are set high relative to the median wage, non-compliance levels in the 
country are also high. Interestingly enough, sectors and occupations with a high Kaitz index are also found to 
have a higher percentage of non-compliance and vice versa (Andalón and Pagés, 2008). Certainly then, the 
ratio of the minimum wage to the median is an interesting measure to consider when investigating the possible 
determinants of non-compliance or violation 5.
As discussed above, results show that the level and depth of violation in South Africa may differ across 
sectors, we included a range of controls capturing the sector of employment of the covered worker.
A variety of control variables surrounding firm-level, contractual, and other employment characteristics were 
also included in the analysis. We attempted to control for the degree of formality of a firm. formal firms were 
defined as those who were reported as both registered and paid VAT, semi-formal firms as those that met 
one of these two criteria, whilst informal firms were defined as those that were neither reported as registered 
nor as paying VAT. The duration of employment, as measured by the tenure variable 6 was also included as a 
5 The Kaitz ratio is estimated as the ratio of the mean minimum wage relative to the median wage in each sector-
occupation-location group. 
6 The tenure variable was derived using information in the labour force Survey on the year the individual started 
working with the current employer. The variable was estimated as the log of the number of years of employment with 
the present employer.
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potential determinant of violation. In addition, we included controls for a written contract, permanent contract, 
and union membership.
An interesting innovation in this paper is to provide a set of spatial variables to proxy for the probability of an 
employer being ‘enforced’ upon. The key measure of enforcement is the number of labour inspectors per 
100,000 persons. Two additional measures of enforcement were constructed, namely the number of labour 
centres per square mile, and the budget (in South African Rands) of the Dol labour offices by province, 
normalised by 100,000. Spatial controls were also included to account for local labour market characteristics, 
specifically the number of broad labour force participants per square mile, and the unemployment rate in the 
district council. Additionally, a dummy variable was constructed for workers in areas classified as ‘A’ type areas. 
These areas listed under this category are generally non-rural and may differ across sectoral determinations 7.
The following section outlines the data and econometric approach to be used in the investigation of the 
various determinants of violation in the South African labour market, in an attempt to isolate their simultaneous 
impact on violation.
4. data and EConomEtriC approaCh
The dataset used was the September edition of the 2007 labour force Survey (lfS) conducted by Statistics 
South Africa (StatsSA) 8. This is the most recent available dataset containing income information for South Africa 9.
for the analysis of the determinants of individual violation, we first use a probit model to investigate the 
determinants of the probability of an individual being violated, or in other words, receiving a wage below 
the stipulated minimum. The probit model is used to determine whether these factors do indeed change 
the likelihood of an individual being paid a wage below the minimum, as well as to quantify the marginal 
effects of the variables. Here, the dependent variable, V0, is a categorical variable, taking on a value of 1 if 
the individual’s wage is below their respective minimum or 0 if their wage is at or above the minimum. The 
violation probit is estimated for the full sample of employed individuals (excluding the self-employed since they 
pay their own wages) who are covered by the Dol sectoral determinations. The equation we wish to estimate 
takes on the following form:
Pr (V0 = 1| X = x) = ø (x’b ) where 0 ≤ P (V ) ≤ 1
where V is the binary dependent variable V0 equal to 1 for violated individuals earning wages below the 
statutory minimum and 0 for their non-violated counterparts, X is a vector of explanatory variables, b are the 
parameters to be estimated, and ø is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Next, for the reduced sample of violated individuals (V0 = 1) only, the determinants of the depth of violation 
(as measured by V1) are estimated by means of OlS regression. Hence V1 was estimated for each individual 
and used as the dependent variable in the regression 10. All non-categorical variables were logged. The OlS 
equation for the depth of violation V1 takes on the following form:
V1ijk = a + bEik + gXi + dZik + eik
where V1ijk refers to the depth of violation V1 for the worker i in sector j and location k (the dependent 
variable), is a vector of enforcement measures for individual i in location k (number of inspectors per 100,000 
7 The reader is referred to Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet, 2010b for a more detailed account of the methodology used in 
mapping workers in the labour force Survey to the different area types.
8 This is a nationally representative survey conducted bi-annually using a rotating panel of households. The survey is 
designed as a stratified sample and uses weights based on the 2001 census. Both rural and urban areas are included.
9 for a detailed discussion of the dataset used as well as the construction of variables, the reader is referred to Bhorat, 
Kanbur, and Mayet, 2010b. 
10 V1 was measured as the individual wage gap using the following formula: (wM-wi)/wM where wM is the minimum wage 
for the individual and wi is the individual’s wage. 
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persons, labour centres per square mile, and Dol budget), b being the key parameter of interest, measuring 
the effect of enforcement on compliance, Xi are demographic, sectoral, and employment characteristics of the 
individual i, and Zik are additional spatial controls. The disturbance term and the constant are captured by eik 
and a respectively. We assume eik is an i.i.d. error term. Since workers in the same district council have the 
same spatial and enforcement measures 11, we cluster the standard errors at the district council level to control 
for the potential presence of an unobserved effect on the error term.
dEaling With EndogEnEity
One of the problems when attempting to investigate the effect of enforcement on compliance is the possibility 
of the reverse causal effect of compliance on enforcement. On the one hand, one would expect enforcement 
to increase compliance since a firm’s propensity to violate may be inversely related to the probability of getting 
caught and/or penalized. On the other hand, low compliance may result in the government agency increasing 
the resources allocated to enforcement, such as the number of labour inspectors. Therefore, Eik is potentially 
correlated with eik. In this case, OlS would become inconsistent.
One strategy to deal with this problem is to find an instrumental variable for the number of labour inspectors. 
We propose here the number of non-inspectors as an instrument. These are Dol employees employed at 
labour centres; however, they do not form part of the inspectorate 12. Hence, we would expect the number of 
non-inspectors to be a strong predictor of changes in the size of the inspectorate, but unrelated to compliance 
with minimum wages 13. given that the number of non-inspectors would not be expected to be correlated 
with the index of violation 14, we use the number of non-inspectors per capita as an instrumental variable 15. 
However, it is important to account for factors that may affect the number of non-inspectors as well as violation, 
and for this purpose, the provincial budget of the Dol was included as a control.
Table 2 presents the results of a first-stage regression of the number of inspectors per 100,000 persons on 
the number of non-inspectors in labour centres (the instrumental variable), and including various controls. 
The results across the specifications show that the instrumental variable is a good predictor of the number of 
labour inspectors. Having found an appropriate instrument, we now analyse the results from the multivariate 
analysis of the determinants of violation below.
11 There are 53 district councils in South Africa, which are contained in 9 provinces. Spatial information was available 
at the district council level. Therefore, workers in the same district councils have the same enforcement and spatial 
characteristics. See Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet (2010b) for a detailed description of the mapping of workers and their 
minima to district councils in the lfS. 
12 labour centres in South Africa consist of a Client Services division, which deals with cases such as those pertaining to 
Unemployment Insurance, Career Services, and the Compensation fund. Complainants file their cases at the Client 
Services helpdesk.
13 The approach followed is similar to that used by levitt (2002), who uses the number of municipal fire-fighters as an 
instrument for police officers in order to estimate the effects of police on crime. 
14 The key assumption here is that the number of non inspectors in a labour centre does not affect the productivity of 
labour inspectors. However, given that the non-inspectors are located in the Client Services division of the labour 
centres, we would not expect them to impact on the productivity of the inspectorate. 
15 The numbers of non-inspectors in labour offices by province, as well as the Department of labour budgetary allocations 
per province were obtained from the Department of labour of South Africa. 
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Table 2: The number of non-inspectors as a predictor of the number of labour inspectors
dependenT Variable inSpecTorS 
per capiTa (logged) i ii iii
non-inSpecTorS per capiTa 
(logged) 2.228* 1.228** 1.751*
(0.548) (0.242) (0.357)
indiVidual conTrolS included No Yes Yes
SecToral conTrolS included No Yes Yes
FirM leVel/conTracTual 
conTrolS included No Yes Yes
SpaTial conTrolS included No Yes Yes
enForceMenT conTrolS 
included No Yes No
obSerVaTionS 9,221 6,923 6,923
r-Squared 0.453 0.741 0.580
adjuSTed F-STaTiSTic 16.52 25.72 29.01









for the covariates which are dummy variables, the following are the referent variables:
RACE: African
AgE: 16-24 years
AREA TyPE A: other area type (B, C, D, or E)
SECTORAl DETERMINATION: Domestic workers
UNION STATUS: Non-union member




Table 3 presents the results (marginal effects) from a probit model investigating the determinants of individual 
violation (V0 ). Three specifications are included, the first being a probit, whilst specifications II and III treat the 
inspector variable as endogenous, using an instrumental variable probit model. Specification II includes only 
one enforcement regressor, namely the inspector variable (instrumented by the number of non-inspectors), 
which is the key measure of enforcement of interest here, as an attempt to investigate its effect on compliance 
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when the other enforcement measures are excluded 16. Specification III is the preferred specification, since it 
includes the full set of individual, sectoral, firm-level, spatial and enforcement controls, as well as controlling 
for the endogeneity of the inspectors variable by instrumenting using the number of non-inspectors.
Table 3: results from violation probit
dependenT Variable = V0
Marginal eFFecT















White -0.348*** 0.0238 -0.348*** 0.0247 -0.347*** 0.0257
Coloured -0.0952*** 0.0309 -0.0801*** 0.0304 -0.0727** 0.0311
Asian -0.125* 0.0692 -0.134* 0.0703 -0.135* 0.0704
Female 0.141*** 0.0311 0.139*** 0.0318 0.138*** 0.0317
English -0.202*** 0.0362 -0.204*** 0.0331 -0.209*** 0.0339
None to Grade 8 -0.0196*** 0.0056 -0.0193*** 0.00573 -0.0190*** 0.00569
Grade 9-11 -0.00562 0.0222 -0.00593 0.0221 -0.00593 0.0221
Grade 12 -0.0879* 0.0465 -0.0865* 0.0464 -0.0861* 0.0463
Diploma -0.157*** 0.0459 -0.158*** 0.0461 -0.162*** 0.0454
Degree -0.109 0.0684 -0.108 0.0672 -0.105 0.0677
25-34 years 0.0235 0.0441 0.0261 0.0437 0.0261 0.0439
35-44 years -0.0617 0.0615 -0.0572 0.0622 -0.0579 0.0623
45-54 years -0.0995 0.0726 -0.0937 0.0734 -0.0934 0.074
55-65 years -0.008 0.0861 0.0002 0.0859 -0.0002 0.0865






Farm 0.132*** 0.0499 0.128** 0.0505 0.127** 0.05
Retail -0.221*** 0.0467 -0.220*** 0.0488 -0.217*** 0.0496
Forestry 0.176** 0.0714 0.155** 0.072 0.151** 0.0722
Taxi -0.126** 0.0509 -0.127** 0.0505 -0.125** 0.0513
Security 0.0792 0.0646 0.0763 0.065 0.0767 0.065
Hospitality -0.156*** 0.0386 -0.154*** 0.0397 -0.154*** 0.0388
Contract Cleaning -0.0372 0.059 -0.0349 0.0586 -0.0343 0.0589













Small firm 0.0674* 0.0371 0.0675* 0.0374 0.0672* 0.0369
Medium firm 0.160** 0.064 0.157** 0.064 0.157** 0.0639
Medium-Large 0.0356 0.0436 0.0323 0.0427 0.0311 0.0425
Union member -0.114*** 0.038 -0.112*** 0.0373 -0.114*** 0.0371
Written -0.143*** 0.0372 -0.142*** 0.0366 -0.145*** 0.0373
Permanent -0.0785** 0.0356 -0.0778** 0.0352 -0.0765** 0.0364
Tenure -0.0465*** 0.0143 -0.0473*** 0.0138 -0.0474*** 0.0138
Formal sector -0.014 0.0505 -0.0124 0.0504 -0.0107 0.0505
Semi-formal -0.0465 0.0416 -0.0496 0.0423 -0.0501 0.0423
Public sector -0.188*** 0.0406 -0.190*** 0.0398 -0.187*** 0.0398
16 To control for the possible multicollinearity of the three enforcement regressors included, we ran separate models with 
each regressor. However, the results of the model were unchanged.
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Area A -0.0129 0.0378 -0.0127 0.0328 -7.13E-05 0.0419
Labour force/mil2 -0.0221*** 0.00721 -0.0300*** 0.00821 -0.0253*** 0.00861
Unemployment rate 0.193*** 0.049 0.153** 0.0631 0.129** 0.0625
Inspectors/100,000 0.015 0.0313 -0.0258 0.0325 -0.0551 0.0472
Provincial Budget 0.014 0.1210 ... ... -0.13 0.1350
Labour centre/mil2 -0.0175 0.0379 ... ... 0.0281 0.0427
Observations 6,923 6,923 6,923







A preliminary analysis of the results in Table 3 suggests that there are a wide range of variables impacting 
on the probability of violation, such as individual, sectoral, enterprise, contractual and spatial characteristics. 
However, the results show that the three enforcement measures included in the analysis, namely the number 
of inspectors per 100,000, Dol budget, and the number of labour centres per square mile, are not significant 
in determining the probability of violation.
The individual characteristics included in the three specifications were race, gender, speaking English as a 
home language, education and age. from the results, it is clear that both race and gender are significant 
determinants of whether or not an individual is paid a wage below his/her legislated minima. The race dummy 
variables for Whites, Coloureds, and Asians yield significant and negative coefficients, suggesting that these 
population groups have a lower probability of being violated than their African counterparts, whilst controlling 
for sectoral, enterprise, spatial and enforcement characteristics. The coefficient for the dummy variable for 
females was positive and significant at the 1% level in all specifications, suggesting that female workers are 
more likely to be violated than males.
The dummy variable for speaking English as a home language was negative and significant at the 1% level in 
all specifications, suggesting that individuals who speak English as a home language are less likely to be paid 
wages that fall below the stipulated minima.
The results from the educational splines suggest that better educated individuals are less likely to be violated. 
The negative and significant coefficient on the grade 12 spline suggests that completion of a Matric qualification 
reduces the probability of violation. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the Diploma variable 
suggests that the completion of a Diploma qualification as opposed to a grade 12 qualification or lower reduces 
the likelihood of an individual being violated. The coefficient for the Degree variable is not significant, implying 
employees who possess a Degree qualification from a university are not less/more likely to be violated than 
their counterparts possessing a Diploma from a non-university higher education institution.
The coefficients for the age variables are not statistically significant, suggesting that age does not play a 
significant role in influencing the probability of violation.
A variable of particular interest here is the Kaitz index, which yields a positive and significant result. This 
implies that workers whose minimum is set at a higher level relative to the median wage in their sector-
occupation-location group have a greater likelihood of violation. These results are robust to all specifications.
The coefficients for the sectoral dummies suggest that the sector of employment play an important role in 
determining the likelihood of violation. Barring the Security and Contract Cleaning sectors, all sectors yield 
significant results. Workers employed in the Retail, Taxi, Hospitality, and Civil Engineering sectors all had a 
lower probability of violation than Domestic workers. This result is as expected, given that Domestic workers 
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are traditionally amongst the most vulnerable workers in the South African economy. farm workers are 
another historically vulnerable sector in South Africa, and the results indicate that farm workers have a higher 
probability of being violated relative to Domestic workers.
The third set of key variables featured in this analysis was a range of enterprise and contractual characteristics 
capturing the nature of employment. The results show that the size of an enterprise 17 is a key predictor of 
the probability of individual violation 18. In all specifications, the results for small (less than 10 employees) and 
medium-sized firms (10 to 19 employees) are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that employees in 
these firms are more likely to be violated than employees in larger enterprises. In other words, this result implies 
that employers in larger firms are more likely to be enforced upon. Or rather, given their visibility, employers 
in large enterprises are less likely to want to engage in practices which violate the minimum wage. Another 
possibility is that large firms are more likely to be unionised than smaller firms: The union dummy coefficient, 
as expected, was negative and statistically significant in all specifications, suggesting that union workers are 
less likely to be violated by employers than their counterparts who are not part of a union. The key result here, 
however, is that large firms are less likely to fail to comply even when controlling for worker unionization.
The formal and semi-formal coefficients were not found to be statistically significant. On the other hand, whilst 
the degree of formality of a firm does not seem to impact on whether or not employees are paid sub-minimum 
wages, whether a firm is located in the public sector or the private sector is a key determinant. Individuals 
employed in public sector firms or in State owned enterprises (SOEs) were significantly less likely to be 
violated than those employed in the non-public sector, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient 
for the public sector dummy variable 19.
The type of contract is also a significant predictor of the probability of violation. In all specifications, the dummy 
variable for a written contract yields a negative and statistically significant result. Employees with a written 
contract are less likely to be violated than those with no contract or an informal contract 20. The dummy variable 
for a permanent employment contract was also negative and significant in all specifications, suggesting that 
workers possessing a permanent contract have a lower likelihood of being violated relative to those engaged 
in non-permanent forms of employment. The tenure variable is also shown to be a significant predictor of 
the probability of being violated. The coefficient on the tenure variable was significant and negative in all 
specifications, indicating that a longer tenure is associated with a significantly lower probability of being violated.
Somewhat contrary to what one would expect, given the literature on the relationship between enforcement 
and compliance, is that our results for the three enforcement variables included are insignificant, including the 
result for the inspector variable. The three enforcement measures, namely the number of labour inspectors 
per 100,000 persons, labour centres per square mile, and the provincial budget of the Dol, yield insignificant 
results across all specifications. In the second specification, the labour inspector variable was included as the 
sole measure of enforcement, to control for the possible multicollinearity between the different enforcement 
measures. However, the result remains insignificant. The absence of a significant result for the inspector 
variable must however be interpreted with caution, given the limitations noted earlier of the data available to 
measure enforcement in this study.
The results for the spatial variables on the other hand, suggest that local labour market dynamics may play a 
role in determining compliance. The variable denoting ‘A’ type areas was not found to be statistically significant 
17 Small firms are those with up to 9 employees, medium firms are those with 10 to 19 employees, medium-large firms 
refers to enterprises with 20 to 50 employees, and large firms are those with over 50 employees. 
18 There is a possibility that firm size may be endogenous to enforcement. We re-estimated the model excluding any 
firm-size regressors, with no material change in the overall results.
19 Interviews with labour inspectors indicate that in South Africa, both public and private sector firms are inspected. 
20 There is a possibility that the contract variable is endogenous to enforcement. We re-estimated the model without the 
contract variable, with no change in the results. 
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in any of the specifications at the 10% level, suggesting that living in an area classified as an ‘A’ area as 
opposed to a less urban area does not significantly alter the probability of a wage earner being violated. On 
the other hand, labour density, as captured by the log of the number of labour participants per square mile, 
is negatively associated with the probability of violation of an individual. The local unemployment rate was 
also significant in all specifications. The coefficient for the unemployment rate was positive and significant 
at the 1% level, indicating that a higher unemployment rate results in a larger probability of violation. This 
finding is consistent with that of Ronconi (2010), who found unemployment to be positively correlated with 
noncompliance in Argentina. This result can be understood if we think of a larger number of unemployed in 
an area as resulting in a higher probability of workers willing to work for sub-minimum wages, and in turn 
leading to a higher likelihood that employers will violate the statutory minima, knowing that surplus labour will 
be supplied at these sub-minimum rates. Overall then, the results suggest that local labour market dynamics 
in South Africa play a significant role in determining individual violation.
Having investigated the determinants of the probability of individual violation, we now turn to an analysis of 
the factors that influence the depth of this violation, as measured by the V1 violation index. Table 4 shows the 
results from the OlS and 2SlS of the effect of enforcement (instrumented by non-inspectors per 100,000 
persons) on V1. The first specification is an OlS regression including the full set of individual, firm-level, 
sectoral, and spatial controls. In specifications II and III the labour inspector variable is treated as endogenous, 
and is instrumented using the number of non-inspectors. Specification II includes only the inspector variable 
as the enforcement measure, whilst specification III includes the two additional enforcement controls in this 
study, specifically the Dol labour budget and the number of labour centres per square mile. Once again, the 
third specification is the preferred specification, since it controls for the endogeneity of the inspector variable 
and including the full set of relevant enforcement controls.
Table 4: olS and 2SlS estimates from regression on V1 
















White -0.3280 0.3620 -0.332 0.3530 -0.328 0.3600
Coloured -0.0661 0.2070 -0.0723 0.1980 -0.0593 0.2310
Asian 0.2990 0.2410 0.293 0.2310 0.294 0.2310
Female -0.0093 0.0781 -0.00976 0.0776 -0.0103 0.0776
English -0.3090 0.2180 -0.312 0.2230 -0.312 0.2250
None to Grade 8 -0.0114 0.0152 -0.0116 0.0154 -0.0114 0.0152
Grade 9-11 -0.134*** 0.0384 -0.134*** 0.0381 -0.134*** 0.0382
Grade 12 0.229** 0.1030 0.228** 0.1030 0.229** 0.1040
Diploma -0.623 0.3730 -0.624 0.3740 -0.621 0.3720
Degree 0.1120 0.3280 0.1100 0.3260 0.1160 0.3310
25-34 years -0.296*** 0.0819 -0.297*** 0.0814 -0.296*** 0.0824
35-44 years -0.136 0.1010 -0.136 0.1030 -0.136 0.1020
45-54 years -0.0475 0.0805 -0.0469 0.0793 -0.0454 0.0788
55-65 years -0.00849 0.1170 -0.00824 0.1190 -0.00689 0.1200






Farm 0.0566 0.1130 0.0562 0.1130 0.0557 0.1130
Retail -0.137 0.1130 -0.139 0.1150 -0.138 0.1130
Forestry -0.0967 0.1910 -0.0994 0.1970 -0.102 0.2010
Taxi 0.00981 0.1550 0.00942 0.1540 0.00986 0.1550
Security 0.247 0.1880 0.242 0.1920 0.245 0.1890
Hospitality 0.124 0.1190 0.123 0.1190 0.125 0.1190
Contract Cleaning 0.215 0.2570 0.215 0.2570 0.216 0.2580
Civil Engineering 0.930** 0.4320 0.934** 0.4350 0.920** 0.4430
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l Small firm 0.0788 0.0610 0.0791 0.0617 0.079 0.0610
Medium firm 0.0691 0.1140 0.0688 0.1150 0.0689 0.1150
Medium-Large firm -0.00938 0.0727 -0.0121 0.0733 -0.0117 0.0723
Union member -0.0655 0.1020 -0.0644 0.1040 -0.0654 0.1030
Written contract -0.137 0.0849 -0.136 0.0893 -0.137 0.0849
Permanent contract -0.205*** 0.0757 -0.204*** 0.0757 -0.204*** 0.0752
Tenure -0.120*** 0.0261 -0.121*** 0.0260 -0.121*** 0.0263
Formal sector -0.168*** 0.0517 -0.168*** 0.0502 -0.168*** 0.0518
Semi-formal -0.155** 0.0748 -0.156** 0.0763 -0.156** 0.0768











T Area A -0.150** 0.0606 -0.149** 0.0678 -0.146** 0.0727
Labour force per mile2 -0.00916 0.0262 -0.0102 0.0304 -0.0107 0.0328
Local unemployment rate 0.559*** 0.1480 0.538** 0.2440 0.544** 0.2200
Inspectors per 100,000 0.0531 0.0542 0.0425 0.1240 0.0338 0.1810
Provincial Budget -0.0114 0.1510 ... ... -0.0499 0.3510
Labour centres per mile2 0.00669 0.0527 ... ... 0.0196 0.1260
conSTanT 0.17 0.1700 1.2690 0.0338 0.1960 0.5030
obSerVaTionS 2,945 2,945 2,945
r2 0.18 0.1799 0.1799








from the results in Table 4, we note that although demographic characteristics were important in determining 
the probability of violation, they do not seem to be important in predicting the depth of violation. The coefficients 
for the race variables and gender were statistically insignificant in all the specifications where they were 
included. The results therefore suggest that while race and gender play a significant role in determining whether 
an individual is violated or not, they are irrelevant in determining the extent of this violation, as measured 
by V1. The English as a home language dummy variable also yields an insignificant result, suggesting that 
whilst native speakers of English may experience a lower likelihood of violation, for violated individuals, home 
language does not appear to have a significant effect on the size of violation.
 The results for the educational splines are generally insignificant, barring the results for the grade 9 to 11 
and the grade 12 spline. The former is negative, implying that for violated individuals who have completed 
between grades 9 and 11, an additional year of schooling can reduce the depth of violation by about 13.4%. 
The result for the grade 12 spline is positive and significant at the 5% level. This would seem to suggest that 
whilst completion of a Matric qualification may yield a reduced likelihood of violation, for those individuals who 
are paid below their respective minimum, a Matric qualification is associated with an increase in the depth of 
violation. The results for the remaining educational splines were not statistically significant.
The coefficients for the age groups indicate that there is a youth bias among violating employers. Individuals 
in the 25-34 years category experience a lower depth of violation than individuals aged between 15 and 24, as 
evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient. Individuals aged between 25 and 34 years experience a 
depth of violation of around 30% lower than their younger counterparts. The remaining age categories do not 
yield statistically significant results.
The level of an individual’s minimum relative to the median wage in the labour market, as measured by the 
Kaitz index (logged), was negative and significant in all four specifications. This result shows that setting a 
minimum wage that is too high relative to the median not only increases the likelihood of violation, but also 
results in a larger depth of violation. A 1% increase in the Kaitz ratio is associated with an increase in the depth 
of violation of the individual of about 0.7%.
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The results for the sectoral dummies were not significant in all four specifications, with the exception of the 
Civil Engineering sector. Hence, whilst most sectors were less likely to be violated than Domestic workers, 
violated individuals in other sectors seem to be no worse relative to Domestic workers. On the other hand, 
whereas Civil Engineers are less likely to be violated than Domestic workers, the depth of violation of these 
individuals is significantly larger. for individuals in the Civil Engineering sector who are earning below the 
minimum, the depth of violation increases by between 92 and 93% 21. This result shows the importance of a 
violation measure capturing both whether or not an individual is violated, as well as the size of their respective 
violation, which allows us to investigate the differences in the factors impacting on both the probability of being 
violated as well as the depth of violation.
Since the coefficient on the union membership categorical variable is not significant, we conclude that union 
membership does not significantly impact on the depth of violation. Examining the contractual variables, we 
observe that whilst a written contract is not significant in determining the depth of violation, the possession of 
a permanent contract is. The coefficient for permanent contract is negative and significant in all specifications 
and suggests that permanent contract holders who are violated have a depth of violation about 20% lower 
than individuals with temporary or other non-permanent contract types. The coefficient of the tenure variable 
is also significant and negative in all specifications. A 1% increase in tenure may reduce the depth of violation 
by around 12%.
While individuals employed in formal firms were found as likely to be violated as their informal counterparts, 
formal and semi-formal types of employment are associated with a significantly smaller depth of violation. In 
all specifications, the coefficients for firms in the formal sector were negative and statistically significant, and 
suggest that employment in a formal firm may decrease an individual’s depth of violation by nearly 17%. Semi-
formal employment is associated with a reduction in the depth of violation of nearly 16%.
The size of an enterprise, which was found to be a significant determinant of the probability of being violated, 
was not found to have a significant impact on the depth of violation. The public sector variable was also not 
found to be statistically significant in influencing the depth of violation of an individual.
We now turn to the last set of covariates, that is, the spatial variables. The coefficient for the Area A (urban) 
dummy variable, which was not relevant in determining the likelihood of violation, has a significant impact 
in determining the depth of violation. The Area A dummy therefore suggests that workers in A type areas 
experience a depth of violation of around 12 to 13% smaller than those in other areas. This may be a reflection 
of the fact that A type areas may be less remote than more rural areas, and hence may be more easily 
accessed by labour inspectors and enforced upon. The local unemployment rate has the effect of significantly 
increasing the severity of violation. A 1% increase in the local unemployment rate is associated with an 
increase in the depth of violation by as much as 0.56%. Hence, violated workers in district councils with high 
rates of unemployment are worse off than those in areas with low unemployment rates. The remaining spatial 
controls, namely labour participants per square mile, provincial budget, and labour centres per square mile, 
were not found to significantly impact on the depth of violation.
Collectively then, the results above suggest that there are a range of variables impacting on the depth of 
violation of an individual, including individual characteristics such as education and age, as well as employment 
and spatial characteristics. However, it seems that there are two categories of variables driving the depth of 
violation, V1. On the one hand, firm-level and contractual factors seem to play an important role, notably 
the term of contract, the length of tenure, and the formality of the firm. On the other hand, local labour 
market characteristics, notably the unemployment rate, play a key role. The key results though remain the 
lack of significance of the enforcement variables, namely the labour inspectorate deployed, Dol budget, and 
labour offices per square mile, on the level and depth of violation, as well as the significance of the local 
unemployment rate and the ratio of the minimum wage to the median (Kaitz ratio).
21 This finding is consistent with the results of Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet (2010b), who showed that whilst the Civil 
Engineering sector recorded the lowest V0 measure in 2007, the depth of violation in this sector, as measured by the 
V1 index, was the largest.
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6. ConClusion
This paper constitutes an early attempt to estimate the causal effect of government enforcement on compliance 
with minimum wages in South Africa. Both the determinants of the likelihood of an individual being violated, 
as well as the determinants of the depth of violation are analysed. The results show that there are a variety of 
factors impacting on the probability and depth of violation, including individual, sectoral, firm-level/contractual, 
and spatial characteristics. Whilst individual characteristics such as race and gender were significant markers 
of whether an employee was violated or not, they were shown to be insignificant in determining the depth of 
violation. Preliminary evidence presented here also suggests a positive correlation between the Kaitz ratio 
(the ratio of the minimum wage to the median) and the level and depth of violation. The results also suggest 
that the local unemployment rate is significant in determining both the level and depth of violation. This may be 
indicative of the extent to which local labour market dynamics can influence compliance with minimum wage 
laws. Surprisingly, the enforcement variables, namely the number of labour inspectors, labour centres per 
square mile, and Dol budget allocation, were not found to significantly impact on compliance.
The analysis and assessment of the determinants of minimum wage compliance in South Africa is just 
beginning. This paper represents a first step, and we hope it will provide the basis for more detailed analysis 
as new and richer datasets become available.
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